Introduction
The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. A rule maps preference pro…les into n shares of the amount M . Sprumont (1991) shows that, given M , if agents have singlepeaked preferences over their shares, the "uniform" allocation rule is the unique strategy-proof, e¢ cient, and anonymous rule. This is a nice example of a large literature that, by restricting the domain of preferences, investigates the possibility of designing strategy-proof rules.
1 Moreover, in this case, single-peakedness does not only allow strategy-proof rules but also e¢ cient ones.
In this paper we ask how much the set of single-peaked preferences can be enlarged to still allow for rules satisfying interesting properties. In particular,
we show that there is a unique maximal domain of preferences that includes the set of single-peaked preferences for which there exists at least one rule satisfying strategy-proofness, e¢ ciency, and strong symmetry. Moreover, we characterize it as the set of feebly single-plateaued preferences.
It turns out that this maximal domain depends crucially on both M and n.
Indeed the egalitarian share M=n plays, as a consequence of the strong symmetry requirement, a fundamental role in its description. In particular, our domain includes only preferences whose set of best shares is an interval and which are weakly monotonic on an interval de…ned by the relative position of M=n and the set of best shares. Our set departs from the single-peaked domain in two signi…cant directions. First, shares outside can be ordered freely. Second, special intervals of indi¤erence are allowed on . The set of these preferences, given M and n, is much larger than the single-plateaued domain studied by Moulin (1984) and Berga (1998) in a public good context, since single-plateaued preferences are strictly monotonic on both sides of the plateau. We do not claim that the domain identi…ed here has economic relevance; rather, we understand our result as giving a precise and de…nite answer to an interesting and economically relevant question.
Furthermore, the intersection of all of our maximal domains, when M varies from 0 to 1, coincides with the single-plateaued domain. This also implies that, when the rule depends not only on preferences but also on the amount M to be allocated, the maximal domain coincides with the set of single-plateaued preferences as already shown by Ching and Serizawa (1998) . Notice that in their setting,
M is treated as a variable of the problem rather than one of its data. We want to emphasize though, that in spite of their result, our analysis with a …xed amount M is meaningful since there are many allocation problems where to assume the contrary would be senseless.
A number of papers have also identi…ed maximal domains of preferences allowing for strategy-proof social choice functions in voting environments. Barberà, Sonneschein, and Zhou (1991) show that the set of separable preferences is the maximal domain that preserves strategy-proofness of voting by committees without dummies and vetoers. Serizawa (1995) , Barberà, Massó, and Neme (1999) , Berga and Serizawa (2000) , and Berga (1997) improve upon this result in several directions; for instance, by either looking at a more general voting model and/or by admitting larger classes of social choice functions.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that, in contrast to all the papers mentioned above, the rule that we exhibit when showing our maximality result is not "topsonly"in the sense that it does not depend exclusively on the n sets of best shares.
E¢ ciency forces the rule to be sensitive to intervals of indi¤erence away from the "top".
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains notation, de…nitions, and the statement of our result. This is proven in Section 3. Section 4 concludes by deriving a weaker version of Ching and Serizawa's (1998) result as a corollary of our theorem and by relating our maximal domains to the "option"sets associated with strategy-proof, e¢ cient, and strongly symmetric rules.
Preliminaries, De…nitions, and the Theorem
Agents are indexed by the elements of a …nite set N = f1; ::; ng where n 2.
They have to share the amount M 2 IR ++ of a perfectly divisible good. An allocation is a vector (x 1 ; :::; x n ) 2 IR n + such that
We denote by Z the set of allocations. Each agent i 2 N has a complete preorder R i over [0; M ], his preference relation. Let P i be the strict preference relation associated with R i and let I i be the corresponding indi¤erence relation. We assume that preferences are R n . When we want to stress the role of agent i's preference we will represent a preference pro…le by (R i ; R i ).
Rules require each agent to report a preference. A rule is strategy-proof if it is always in the best interest of an agent to reveal his preferences truthfully.
Formally, De…nition 1. A rule on V n , , is strategy-proof if for all (R 1 ; :::; R n ) 2 V n , all i 2 N , and all R
Given a preference pro…le R 2 V n , an allocation x 2 Z is e¢ cient if there is no z 2 Z such that for all i 2 N , z i R i x i , and for at least one j 2 N we have
Denote by E (R) the set of e¢ cient allocations.
A rule is e¢ cient if it selects an e¢ cient allocation. Formally,
We are also interested in rules satisfying the following property.
De…nition 3. A rule on V n , , is strongly symmetric if for all R 2 V n and all i,j 2 N such that R i = R j , we have i (R) = j (R).
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We will consider di¤erent subsets of preferences, all of them related to singlepeakedness. For the de…nitions we need the following notation. Given a preference R i 2 R we denote the set of preferred shares according to
Abusing notation, we also denote by p (R i ) the unique element of the set p (R i )
The …rst de…nition is the classical notion of single-peakedness. It requires that the preference R i has a unique maximal element p (R i ) and on each side preference is monotonic and strict. Formally,
for all x; y 2 [0; M ] we have xP i y whenever y < x < p (R i ) or p (R i ) < x < y.
Let R s be the set of single-peaked preferences on [0; M ]. The following rule on R s , the uniform allocation rule, has been extensively studied.
De…nition 5. The uniform allocation rule on R n s , U , is de…ned as follows: for all R 2 R n s and all i 2 N , Ching (1994) characterized the uniform allocation rule on R n s as the unique one satisfying strategy-proofness, e¢ ciency, and symmetry.
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The second de…nition of preferences is a bit weaker since it allows for indi¤er-ences at the top.
and for all x; y 2 [0; M ] we have xP i y whenever y < x < p(R i ) or p(R i ) < x < y.
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Let R sp be the set of single-plateaued preferences. The following rule on R n sp constitutes a natural extension of the uniform allocation rule to the domain of single-plateaued preferences.
De…nition 7. The uniform allocation rule on R n sp , , is de…ned as follows: for all R 2 R n sp and all i 2 N ,
Finally, our third de…nition of preferences, the weakest one, refers to the following interval (R i ), which will play a fundamental role in the sequel:
Before stating the formal de…nition, it seems useful to give a verbal explanation of the set of feebly single-plateaued preferences. A preference relation R i 2 R is feebly single-plateaued if its set of best shares is an interval and the following additional properties are satis…ed.
; p(R i ) , then the preference has to be "increasing" between
M=n and its smallest best share p(R i ), although it may have intervals of indifference provided these intervals are su¢ ciently large in relation to M . Moreover, the egalitarian share M=n has to be at least as good as all smaller shares, but all orderings are possible among them.
, then the preference has to be "decreasing"between its largest best share p(R i ) and M=n, although it may have intervals of indi¤erence provided these intervals are su¢ ciently small in relation to M . 5 Moreover, the egalitarian share M=n has to be at least as good as all larger shares, but also all orderings are possible among them.
Formally,
x M=n] then [xR i y and if xI i y then there exists
We denote by R f sp the set of feebly single-plateaued preferences. Notice that this preference restriction implies a "weak-monotonicity" condition on the corresponding intervals ( ) and that the number of agents n also appears in conditions 
Insert Figure 1 here Following Ching and Serizawa (1998) we can de…ne, given a list of properties that a rule may satisfy, the concept of "a maximal domain of preferences for this list". (3) there is no rule on Q n satisfying the same properties such that R m ( Q R:
Theorem 1. The set of feebly single-plateaued preferences, R f sp , is the unique maximal domain including R s for the properties of strategy-proofness, e¢ ciency, and strong symmetry.
Before proving Theorem 1 we illustrate, in Example 1 below, the reason why e¢ ciency and strong symmetry together force the domain to contain only preferences with intervals of indi¤erence of a very special type away from the set of best shares. yP x for all 0 x < y 3 and all 6 x < y 8, yÎx for all x; y 2 [3; 6].
Note that condition (a) of De…nition 8 is satis…ed because the sum of the extremes of the indi¤erence interval [3; 6] is larger than 8. ThereforeR 2 R f sp . In contrast, the allocation R ;R = (4; 4) belongs to E R ;R .
To illustrate the role of condition (b) in De…nition 8 consider the preferenceR
xP y for all 0 x < y 3 and all 6 x < y 8, xĨy for all x; y 2 [3; 6].
In this caseR = 2 R f sp because now the sum of the extremes of the indi¤erence interval is larger than 8. By strong symmetry R ;R = (4; 4) but 2P 4 and 6Ĩ4 which indicates that R ;R = 2 E R ;R , contradicting the e¢ ciency of . 
The Proof of Theorem 1
Before proving Theorem 1 we state, in the following remark, a consequence of Ching's characterization (Ching, 1994 ) that we will repeatedly use in this section.
Remark 1. Let be any rule on V n ( R n s ) satisfying strategy-proofness, e¢ -ciency, and strong symmetry. If R 2R n s then (R) = U (R); that is, coincides with the uniform allocation rule on the subset of single-peaked preferences.
Let R m be a subset of preferences satisfying the following condition: R s ( R m R. Suppose that there exists a rule on R n m , , satisfying strategy-proofness, e¢ ciency, and strong symmetry. Assume R m is a maximal domain in R satisfying these properties. To show that R m = R f sp we will use the following Lemmata, where R 0 ; R M 2 R s will denote the two single-peaked preferences such that
Lemma 1. Let R 0 2 R m and x; y 2 [0; M ] be arbitrary.
Proof of Lemma 1. Case 1: Suppose otherwise; that is, there exist R 0 2 R m and x,y 2 [0; M ] such that M=n x < y p (R 0 ) and xP 0 y. We can also …nd (see Figure 2) 
, and (a.4) x 0 P 0 x for all x 2 (x 0 ; y 0 ) .
Insert Figure 2 here
Notice that x 0 is the smallest value below p (R 0 ) and above M=n at which R 0 starts decreasing to its right. 6 Since R 0 is continuous and p (R 0 ) R 0 x, the existence of such y 0 follows. Obviously, x 0 could be equal to M=n, y 0 equal to p (R 0 ), or both.
Note that for all z 0 2 (x 0 ; y 0 ) the following inequalities hold:
Now, …x z 0 2 (x 0 ; y 0 ) and let R 2 R s be such that p R =
The existence of such a preference R follows from (3.1).
LetR 2 R s be any preference such that p R = x 0 : By Remark 1, R ; R; :::; R = U R ; R; :::; R , and since By (3.6) and Lemma 1 we have that for all " 2 0; min
depending on whether " is either equal to Note that
Now, let R 2 R s be any single-peaked preference such that p R = Then by (3.10) and (3.11), R 0 ; R; :::; R = x 2 ; M x 2 n 1 ; :::; M x 2 n 1 (3.12) with y 1 x 2 M=n and x 2 I 0 M=n (by construction). But then, since
, R 2 R s , and all preference orderings are transitive, the allocation x 1 ; M x 1 n 1 ; :::;
and (3.12) imply that R 0 ; R; :::; R = 2 E R 0 ; R; :::; R contradicting the e¢ -ciency of .
Case 2: Its proof is omitted since it follows an argument which is symmetric to the one used to prove Case 1. In order to obtain a contradiction, assume that x 0 + y 0 M . Let z 0 2 (x 0 ; y 0 )
be any share such that M=n z 0 and
Subcase 1.1: n 3 and there exists an integer n 0 such that n n 0 3 and
Notice that the latter condition is only possible if x 0 + y 0 M .
Let R 2 R s be such that
Notice that M=n
De…ne R 0 = ( R 0 ; :::; R 0 | {z } we have that n (R 0 ) = t 3 RM=n 0 , which implies (3.20) But the existence of the allocation t 0 1 ; :::; t 0 1 ; 0; :::; 0; t 3 and (3.18) imply that 
But the existence of the allocation (z 0 ; :::; z 0 ; 0; :::; 0; z 1 ) and (3.21) imply that
. To see this, …rst notice that z 1 Pt 3 since p R = z 1 and z 1 6 =t 3 .
Moreover, (3:22) implies M=n 0 t 1 y 0 . Therefore, sincet 1 y 0 , we have that We can also …nd " > 0 such that y 0 < z 0 + ", x 0 < z 0 ", (z 0 + ") P 0 M=2, and (z 0 ") I 0 M=2. Therefore, the existence of " > 0 such that (z 0 "; z 0 + ") 2 Z and (3.25) imply that (R 0 ; R 0 ) = 2 E (R 0 ; R 0 ), contradicting the e¢ ciency of .
Case 2: Its proof is omitted since it follows an argument which is symmetric to the one used to prove Case 1.
Proof of Theorem 1: Let R 0 2 R m be arbitrary. We have to show that R 0 is feebly single-plateaued. Consider the following cases: 
and hence xI 0 P (R 0 ).
To show that property (c) of De…nition 8 holds, assume …rst that p (R 0 ) = M=n and let x be any share such that p (R 0 ) < x p (R 0 ). By Lemma 1 (Case 1)
By Lemma 2 (Case 1),
First, let x be any share such that p (R 0 ) < x < M=n p (R 0 ). By Lemma 1 (Case 2) xR 0 M=n and by (3.26), xI 0 p (R 0 ). Second, let x be any share such that
. By Lemma 1 (Case 1) xR 0 M=n and by (3.26),
proof that properties (b) and (c) of De…nition 8 hold is symmetrical to that of Case A, using Cases 2's of Lemmata 1, 2, and 4, respectively.
The proof of Theorem 1 is completed by exhibiting a rule on the set of feebly single-plateaued preferences , (R f sp ) n ; that satis…es the properties of strategyproofness, e¢ ciency, and strong symmetry. We obtain such a rule by extending the uniform allocation rule on the domain of single-plateaued preferences, R sp , to this larger domain.
The extended uniform rule on (R f sp ) n , , is de…ned by the following algorithm:
let R = (R 1 ; :::; R n ) 2 (R f sp ) n be any pro…le of feebly single-plateaued preferences.
Stage 0: Let R = R 1 ; :::; R n 2 R n sp be any pro…le of single-plateaued prefer-
and let S 0 be the set of agents receiving an amount in the interior of a maximal interval of indi¤erence for R i (the original preference), denoted by [x 
Go to stage 1. Now, for k 1, and given that the algorithm has not stopped yet at stage k-1, stage k is as follows.
Stage k: Given the preference pro…le R k = R ; that is, x for all x > y
Go to stage k+1.
The algorithm stops after at most n stages. This is because the sets S k only contain players whose stage k proposed shares are not maximal. Hence, for all
Note that the rule satis…es strategy-proofness and strong symmetry. To show that it satis…es e¢ ciency, let R = (R 1 ; :::; R n ) 2 (R f sp ) n be arbitrary and consider the following cases:
Then, e¢ ciency is clearly satis…ed because i R 0 2 p(R i ); p (R i ) for all i 2 N implies that S 0 = ; and the process stops at stage 0 after setting
which means that (R) 2 E (R).
Case 2: M P p(R j ). Then, it is easy to show that i (R) p(R i ) for all i 2 N . Let S be the subset of agents who are rationed; that is,
Therefore, suppose S 6 = ; and assume that (R) = 2 E (R); that is, there exist a feasible allocation r = (r 1 ; :::; r n ) 2 Z and j 2 N such that:
However, (3.27) and the de…nition of imply that j 2 S and j (R) < r j . Denote by [x j ; y j ] the maximal interval of indi¤erence containing j (R). By de…nition of , for all i 2 S;
Consider the preference pro…le R 2 (R f sp ) n where
a contradiction with the fact that R satis…es De…nition 8.
Case 3: Assume that P p (R j ) M . Then, an argument symmetric to the one used in Case (2) proves that (R) 2 E (R).
Concluding Remarks
We close with two remarks. First, we show how to derive a slightly weaker version of Ching and Serizawa (1998) A rule on V n R (1) n and IR ++ is a function
Consider the natural extensions of strategy-proofness, e¢ ciency, symmetry, and strong symmetry to this new setting, where rules are de…ned on V n and IR ++ . 8 Denote them by sp (1), ef f (1), sy (1), and ssy (1).
The de…nition below adapts our concept of maximal domain of preferences to their setting. Ching and Serizawa (1998) prove that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the unique maximal (in…nite) domain including single-peaked preferences for sp (1), ef f (1), and sy (1). Theorem 2 below identi…es the single-plateaued domain using the strong version of symmetry.
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Theorem 2. The set of single-plateaued preferences, R sp (1), is the unique maximal (in…nite) domain including single-peaked preferences for sp (1), ef f (1), and ssy (1).
Proof. Let R a (1) be a domain on which there is a rule 1 on R a (1) n and IR ++ satisfying sp (1), ef f (1), and ssy (1). Assume also that R s (1) R f sp (M ). Hence R a (1) = R sp (1).
Second, the interval (R i ) is intimately related with "option" sets, where given a rule on V n and a preference R i 2 V we de…ne the set of options left open to the other agents by i declaring R i at as
This is not surprising, since option sets also play a fundamental role to describe maximal domains in voting environments. The main two ideas are the following.
Given a preference R i , alternatives at the left (right) of the top plateau and outside the option set have to be worse than the smallest (largest) alternative in the option set. Moreover, the preference R i has to be single-plateaued on the option set.
It is easy to show here that, given a preference R i 2 R f sp and a strategy-proof, e¢ cient and strongly symmetric rule on (R f sp ) n , the relationship between (R i ) and (R i ) is as follows. Suppose that R i is such that M=n does not belong to an indi¤erence interval, then (R i ) = (R i ). Barberà, S. (1996) . "Notes on strategy-proof social choice functions,"in Social
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Footnotes
1 See Sprumont (1995) and Barberà (1996) for two comprehensive surveys of this literature as well as for two exhaustive bibliographies 2 Ching (1994) names this property equal treatment of equals. Ching and Serizawa (1998) use the name of symmetry when the condition i (R) = j (R) is replaced by i (R) I i j (R).
3 See Ching (1992), Schummer and Thomson (1997) , Sprumont (1991) , Thomson (1994 Thomson ( ), (1995 Thomson ( ), and (1997 for alternative characterizations of the uniform allocation rule. In a recent paper, Weymark (1999) shows that Sprumont's characterization using e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, and anonymity still holds if continuity of the preferences is not required.
4 See Moulin (1984) and Berga (1998) for characterizations of strategy-proof rules under this domain restriction in a public good context.
5 See Example 1 at the end of Section 2 for an illustration of why e¢ ciency imposes these conditions on the intervals of indi¤erence.
6 We often abuse language by using utility representation terminology to refer to properties of preference relations.
7 Notice that the e¢ ciency of implies that if M P p (R j ) then i (R) p (R i ) and therefore y 0 i < p (R i ). Symmetrically, if
and therefore x 0 i > p (R i ). The same argument will apply also in all stages.
8 This means that we have to replace, in De…nitions 1, 2, and 3, the expression "for all R 2 V n "by the expression "for all (R; M ) 2 V n IR ++ ".
9
It is an open question whether the maximal domain identi…ed in Theorem 1 becomes larger if we substitute strong symmetry by symmetry.
